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1. Preface 
There is a saying of “three one-third” about China’s cigarette market in the 
world that is more than 300 million smokers, accounts for one-third of the 
world’s total smokers; China grows one-third of the world’s tobacco leaves and 
produces and sells one-third of the world’s cigarettes. China’s tobacco industry 
is the main contributor of the state revenue which contributes as much as 10% 
of the total annually. Such enormous contribution has been achieved under the 
lower tax rate of no more than 46%. 
The objective of my thesis is: 
To comprehensively introduce the generation, the development and the 
present situation of the China’s tobacco taxation system as well as the state 
tobacco monopoly system; and to deeply analyze the significant impacts of the 
China’s tobacco taxation on the tobacco industry, the government action, the 
tobacco control and the national economy and so on. 
The thesis is divided into several chapters as follows: 
China’s tobacco monopoly system is introduced in the second chapter. 
Different from most of the other countries in the world China implements a 
tobacco monopoly system, i.e. a state monopoly on the tobacco industry. The 
industry monopoly resulted from the monopoly system generated huge 
monopoly profits, and certainly brought forth huge tax revenue to the state 
finance as well. 
The third chapter presents the structure of China’s tobacco tax and its 
distribution. China’s tobacco tax items include mainly the tobacco leaf tax, 
cigarette tax and other tobacco-industry-related taxes. And these taxes are 
collected and distributed in the tax distribution system. 
The four reforms of China’s tobacco taxation are presented in the fourth 
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and fifth chapters. Each reform of the Chinese tobacco taxation had a huge 
impact on the tobacco industry and even the national economy. The latest 
adjustment started from May 2009. Its aim is not only to raise the government’s 
financial revenue, but also to meet international anti-smoking trend. The fourth 
reform increased the state revenue, but the result of the tobacco control was 
much less than expected.  
The sixth chapter explains the influences of China’s tobacco taxation on 
the action of the local government. As the financial revenues are largely 
supported by the tobacco tax, some local governments are over dependant on 
the tax revenue of the tobacco industry. In order to get more benefits, these 
local governments used and even abused the policy of the Chinese tobacco 
taxation to interfere with the tobacco industry. 
Raising the tobacco tax is recognized by the international community as a 
most effective economic measure for the tobacco control. This point is analyzed 
in depth in the seventh chapter. 
The WTO impacts on China’s tobacco taxation are presented in the eighth 
chapter. With the accession to the WTO the strict control of importing and 
exporting tobacco has been loosened step by step. It has great influence on 
China’s tobacco taxation. With the changes of various tariff and non-tariff 
policies, China must accordingly adjust and improve the tobacco tax system. 
In the last chapter, on the base of the presentations and analyses in the 
preceding chapters I have some suggestions to China’s tobacco taxation. 
  7
2. China’s tobacco monopoly system 
The tobacco industry management systems in most countries tend to 
change to be more market-oriented from the previously 
government-monopolized. For example: (1) With the integration of the EU, 
many EU-countries reformed the tobacco management system: to end up the 
monopoly system that’s been through for nearly one hundred years and to 
accomplish the reform of marketization and corporatization. (2) Due to the 
change of the social system, the tobacco monopoly system was replaced by 
the liberalization and privatization in the former Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe. (3) Similar policies were adopted in Africa and South America, 
especially in the last twenty years the marketization and privatization 
(demutualization) of the tobacco management have gone forward even faster. 
(4) In Asia, Japan, South Korea and Thailand etc. abolished the tobacco 
monopoly system.  
There are two distinctive features reflected in the reformation of the 
tobacco industry management across different countries of the world: first, 
tobacco industries all adopted a state monopoly system; second, the 
management system of the tobacco industries changed from state monopoly to 
market-oriented evolution. 
Since 1980s more and more countries have abolished the tobacco 
monopoly system, but the government controls, such as the tobacco 
franchising, administrative license etc. are still there.  
For example,: 
① France  In 1995, with the privatization of Seita, the tobacco monopoly 
system was completely abolished in France. But the French government does 
not give up the government control on the tobacco by implementing 
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administrative licensing and franchise system. E.g. the importers and 
distributors of the tobacco must obtain the special permit and the retailers are 
also required to obtain a permit. The prices of domestic and imported cigarettes 
are all decided on by the French Ministry of Finance and were unified for retails 
nationwide. The wholesale business of cigarette is monopolized by Seita. The 
import business from outside the EU must be operated by Seita. No foreign 
investment is allowed to build new cigarette manufactory. 
② Spain  The Spanish government regulates the tobacco business by 
implementing the permit system. The permits are required throughout the 
whole process of the cigarette sales either for retails or the wholesales.  
③  Japan  In 1985, Japan canceled the tobacco monopoly system, 
however continues to maintain the monopoly of the tobacco production and the 
control on cigarette price, meanwhile implement the administrative permit 
system in the cigarette retail. In 1994, the state-owned enterprise – Japan 
Tobacco Inc. (JT) was restructured into joint-stock limited company. The 
Japanese government holds more than half of the JT’s shares by law, actually 
holds two-thirds of the shares. 
④ USA  Never before has the U.S. government implemented a tobacco 
monopoly system, but the tobacco control has always existed. The U.S. also 
carried out the license system on the production and sales of tobacco product. 
According to the law, it must owe to the federal government instead of the state 
to start a manufacturing enterprise. 
China is one of the only two countries which implement state tobacco 
monopoly system (the other one is North Korea). The Chinese government 
plays so important role through the tobacco monopoly system that it strictly 
controls the production of tobacco leaves and the manufacture and the sales of 
cigarettes for the entire country. This system has a far-reaching impact on 
China’s tobacco tax. Therefore, it is important for us to know China’s tobacco 
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monopoly system before making the analysis on China’s tobacco tax. 
2.1. Establishment and legalization of China’s tobacco 
monopoly system 
? In 1981, the State Council decided to make a big reformation on the 
contemporary tobacco management system which is to initiate to establish 
China National Tobacco Company (CNTC) and to implement the national 
tobacco monopoly. Later on CNTC was formally founded on January 1, 
1982.  
? In 1983, the State Council approved and formed the State Tobacco 
Monopoly Administration (STMA) which bears the responsibility of the 
administration on the tobacco monopoly.  
? Still in 1983, the “Regulations of the Peoples Republic of China on Tobacco 
Monopoly” was issued by the State Council on September 23 and was put 
into effect from November 1, 1983. This law marked the official 
implementation of China’s tobacco monopoly system that has lasted till 
today. 
? On June 29, 1991, China National People’s Congress ratified the first law 
ever in history of the China’s tobacco industry – “Law of the Peoples 
Republic of China on Tobacco Monopoly”. This law legalized the statement 
on the tobacco monopoly system, the unified management and the vertical 
leadership system of the tobacco industry. 
? July 3, 1997, the State Council promulgated the “Regulation for the 
Implementation of the Law of the Peoples Republic of China on Tobacco 
Monopoly”. This regulation refined and extended the Principles of the “Law 
on Tobacco Monopoly”, and further consolidated and developed the 
tobacco monopoly system. 
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2.2. The tobacco monopoly 
STMA and CNTC are the real combination of government administration 
and business operation. Being the mechanism that implement the tobacco 
monopoly system they strictly take control of every aspect of the tobacco 
production, sales and policy settings, etc.. CNTC and its regional branch offices 
throughout China constitute a huge business monopoly organization. 
? The cigarettes production plan is designated by CNTC, and then each 
province is assigned for different production quota. This means that the 
output of cigarettes is controlled by CNTC. In the case of a certain domestic 
demand, the control of the output would inevitably result in a high monopoly 
price of the cigarette. 
? The production and the sales of cigarettes are controlled by STMA through 
the production permit and the sales permit. In order to ensure the control be 
effective very few or no tobacco products are imported from foreign 
countries. 
? STMA also determined the planting areas of the tobacco leaf. Tobacco 
growers are allowed to sell the tobacco leaves only to the regional office of 
CNTC. Thus the production materials are in good control as well. 
2.3. Impacts of China’s tobacco monopoly system 
2.3.1. The positive impacts 
Before the tobacco monopoly system was introduced China’s tobacco 
industry was in a chaotic situation which was e.g. the blind development, the 
management confusion, the quality decline of cigarettes and the serious 
disconnection between production and marketing of the cigarette. The 
newly-implemented monopoly ended up the chaos. The new system balanced 
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the production, supply and sales of the cigarette; improved the cigarette quality; 
satisfied the cigarette consumption demand and contributed a lot to the state 
revenue. 
2.3.2. The negative impacts 
The essence of the tobacco monopoly system is the administrative 
monopoly: It’s in nature against the marketing competition. 
? As the planting area of the tobacco leaf and the tobacco production are 
decided by the quotas offered and the local tax revenues are closely related 
to the tobacco production, even the regions without comparative 
advantages of tobacco planting planted tobacco leaves. Each provinces 
vied with each other to build a lot of tobacco manufacturing enterprises. 
This caused enterprises with high production efficiency not to achieve 
economies of scale because of the deficient production quotas, whereas 
enterprises with low production efficiency made undue profits because they 
had the production quotas. 
? The local government takes the advantage of tobacco monopoly preventing 
the foreign tobacco products going into the local market. The restriction 
aggravated the regional segmentation of the tobacco market and was more 
likely to make the monopoly a tool for local protectionism. 
? The market monopoly resulted in the high monopoly price of the cigarettes. 
And meanwhile consumers are limited to consume the local cigarettes only. 
? In an industry of competition inefficient production resource allocation may 
occur due to the government monopoly which subjectively limited the 
market competition. The resources of the tobacco production in China are 
allocated usually not by the market, but by the production planning and 
quotas of CNCT. It is thus difficult to optimize the allocation of the resource. 
If the enterprises are private, they would at least consider saving costs to 
  12
maximize the profits. However, in order to ensure the implementation of the 
tobacco monopoly system, all the Chinese tobacco enterprises are 
state-owned. Due to the hollow position of the subject of state ownership, 
and the production and operation of state-owned enterprises are often 
costly. Both of above caused the double inefficient allocation of resources. 
? Under the monopoly the price of the tobacco product is much higher than it 
should be in the free competitive marketing environment. Out of the drive of 
pursuing high profits, smuggling activities and counterfeit cigarettes 
emerge endlessly. 
2.4. China’s tobacco monopoly system will continue 
China’s tobacco monopoly system is a complete monopoly, i.e. a state 
monopoly. It’s structured by “the unified leadership, the vertical administration 
and the monopoly franchises”. It is an important economic and legal system 
that ensures the state revenue.  
The commissioner of STMA, Jiang Chengkang, made it clear that the 
tobacco monopoly system will continue to be implemented as long as the 
annual profit and tax of the tobacco remain over RMB 100 billion. 
According to the data of the Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology (MIIT), the profit and the tax of the tobacco industry in 2008 totaled 
RMB 457.18 billion, accounted for 7% of the total fiscal revenue. And the 
tobacco industry accounted for 2/3 of the consumption taxes (RMB 256.78 
billion) in 2008. The data shows that the tobacco industry is the undoubted 
major tax contributor of the state revenue. Such huge profit and tax were 
created in the tobacco monopoly system. Therefore, China’s tobacco monopoly 
system will not be repealed and will continue to perform.  
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3. Breakdown of China’s tobacco tax and its 
distribution 
China’s tax revenue consists of two parts, one is for the central government 
and the other for the local. The central government collects value-added tax, 
personal and enterprise income tax, consumption tax, and customs tax. The 
local government collects business tax, special tobacco leaf tax, and city 
maintenance tax and construction tax. There are two tobacco-oriented taxes: 
the tobacco leaf tax and the cigarette tax. 
3.1. Breakdown of China’s tobacco tax  
Table 1: China’s tobacco tax  
Type of tax Tax rate  Revenue beneficiary
1． Tobacco leaf tax 20% 
100% 
local government 
2． Value-added tax  
at cigarette manufacture 
17% 
75% 
central government；
25% local government
3． Consumption tax   
3.1. Specific excise tax 
RMB 0.60/carton 
(or RMB 0.06/pack) 
3.2. Ad valorem tax  
≧ RMB 70/carton 56% 
﹤ RMB 70/carton 36% 
3.3. Ad valorem tax 
at wholesale link 5% 
100% 
central government 
1 carton = 10 packs or 200 cigarettes 
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3.1.1. Tobacco leaf tax 
The tobacco leaf is an agricultural product. From the end of 1994 a tax rate 
of 31% had been imposed on the tobacco leaf growers in the process of 
tobacco leaf purchasing in the name of “Agricultural Product Tax”. In 1999, the 
tax rate was reduced from 31% to 20%. The tax is collected by the local tax 
authorities and goes to the local government  
In 2006, the central government decided to relieve farmers’ financial 
burdens by eliminating all agricultural product taxes. However, the agricultural 
product tax of the tobacco leaf was retained, renamed “tobacco leaf tax”, tax 
rate is 20%. These tax revenues are withheld by CNTC at the point of tobacco 
leaf procurement, and then are turned over to the local government. 
3.1.2. Cigarette tax 
China’s cigarette tax consists of value-added tax (VAT) and consumption 
tax (specific excise tax and ad valorem tax). 
1) Value-added tax 
Since 1994, the Chinese government has levied VAT on the cigarette 
production by 17%. One of the main features is that this tax is charged in the 
manufacturing process that is to charge the cigarette manufacturers. 
2) Consumption tax 
① Specific excise tax 
Such kind of tax is based on the amount, i.e. taxation according to quantity. 
Since 2001, a specific excise tax of RMB 150 per case (50000 cigarettes or 
2500 packs or RMB 0.06 per pack) has been imposed on all cigarettes. 
② Ad valorem tax 
Such kind of the tax is based on the price, i.e. taxation according to price. 
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The sales price (the appropriation price) is the transaction price between 
cigarette manufacturers and wholesalers, which does not include the VAT. 
From May 2009 onward the most recently updated ad valorem tax rate are 
shown below: 
υ 56% for cigarettes with an appropriation price higher than or equal to 
RMB 70 per carton; 
υ 36% for cigarettes with an appropriation price less than RMB 70 per 
carton. 
υ A new ad valorem tax has been imposed at wholesale link by 5% of the 
wholesale price. 
3.1.3. Other tobacco industry relevant tax items 
The tax revenue from the tobacco industry, in addition to the tobacco leaf 
tax and the cigarette tax, include also other tax items: 
?  1.5% “Educational Surtax”; 
? 15% of the after-tax profit as a “Tobacco Monopoly Profits” is levied at 
commercial tobacco enterprises; 
? 25% of the taxable income as “Enterprise Income Tax”; 
? Other “Business Tax” and “City Maintenance and Construction Tax”, etc. 
3.2. The Chinese import tax on foreign cigarettes 
The consumption tax for imported cigarettes and the domestic ones are the 
same: 
? The Chinese Customs Office first levies a specific excises tax, at RMB 150 
per case. 
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? Then, based on the price of the imported foreign cigarettes (also taken into 
account the customs tax) 56% of the ad valorem tax levied for those priced 
higher than or equal to RMB 70 per carton; 36% for those priced less than 
RMB 70 per carton. 
3.3. Distribution of the China’s tobacco tax 
? First, the tobacco leaf tax, as the only preserved agricultural tax, goes to the 
local government. 
? Cigarette tax is the dominant part of the tobacco tax as well as an important 
source of local revenue for the tobacco production areas. At the current 
stage the revenues from the cigarette tax are shared as follows: 
υ As what’s dealt with the general merchandise 75% of VAT goes to the 
central government while 25% goes to the local. 
υ Consumption tax belongs to the central government. However, in most 
cases the central government transfers a portion of the consumption 
tax to local government. The eligibility and the amount of the 
transferable tax depend on the growth of the “two taxes” in local areas 
(VAT and consumption tax) the same year. 
? Enterprise income tax is mutually shared by both the central and local 
government. Each accounts for 50% 
? Both city construction and maintenance tax and education surtax are local 
government taxes. 
It’s just due to such kind of distribution relationship that the local 
government, especially the government of the main producing area, has relied 
excessively on the tax of tobacco industry, which led to some unreasonable 
acts of the local government. I will further explain this in Chapter 6. 
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4. Reforms of China’s tobacco tax 
For fifteen years of time between 1994 and 2009 China had gone through 
three major reforms on the tobacco tax. The latest adjustment started from May 
2009 and marked a new round of reformation. From the past experience each 
reform would result in a reshuffle of the China’s tobacco industry.  
4.1. The first reform of China’s tobacco tax 
Before 1994 China’s tobacco industry had enjoyed a uniform 60% 
production tax as the other industries did. After the “tax distribution system” was 
implemented from 1994 onwards the production tax was transformed to 17% 
VAT and the new consumption tax. Tobacco product became the main targeted 
item of the consumption tax. A uniform 40% consumption tax was imposed on 
all types of cigarettes based on the factory price. 
At the same time, cigarettes were divided into five classes (the price of the 
cigarette excl. VAT): class 1: over RMB 25.64 / carton; class 2: RMB 17.09 ~ 
25.64 / carton; class 3: RMB 8.55 ~ 17.09 / carton; class 4: RMB 4.27 ~ 8.55 / 
carton; class 5: less than RMB 4.72 / carton. 
This was the first tax reform on the tobacco industry. As on all different 
classes of cigarettes a uniform 40% consumption tax was levied, the tobacco 
manufacturers would prefer to produce more profitable higher class cigarettes. 
The tobacco product focus shifted from low-grade to top-grade cigarettes. 
Hence, the supply of the low-grade cigarette was unable to meet the needs of 
the market. This tax policy imposed great losses on small and medium cigarette 
manufacturers. 
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4.2. The second reform of China’s tobacco tax 
To July 1, 1998, in order to promote the rationalization of product structure 
of the cigarette, the Chinese government reformed the cigarette excise tax 
again, adjusted the rate structure of the cigarette excise tax. The cigarette tax 
resisted into three excise tax rates: 50% for the class 1 cigarette; 40% for the 
class 2 and 3 cigarettes and 25% for the class 4 and 5 cigarettes. Thus, the 
different tax rates replaced the single tax rate. The tax rate on class 1 cigarettes 
increased by 10%, and the tax rate on class 4 and 5 cigarettes was reduced by 
15%. 
After the implementation of this tobacco tax policy, the production and 
sales volume of the low-grade cigarette increased significantly. Some small and 
medium cigarette manufacturers’ productions recovered because of the tax 
cuts. Meanwhile the profits of large cigarette manufacturers which produce 
more top-grade cigarettes dropped sharply because of the tax increase. The 
dominance of the large cigarette manufacturer was weakened. It was more 
difficult for small cigarette manufacturers to shut down, stop down, merge, 
change products or move to other sites. To the organizational restructuring of 
the tobacco industry had made a negative impact. 
In addition, during this time the cigarette excise tax had been levied 
according to the factory price at the production link. A lot of cigarette 
manufacturers avoided the tax through transfer pricing1. 
4.3. The third reform of China’s tobacco tax 
On June 2001, in order to promote the internal restructuring on the tobacco 
                                                        
1 For example: A tobacco group corporation subordinate cigarette manufactory produces a kind of cigarette. The 
market price of the kind of cigarette is RMB 70 per carton (exclude VAT). The manufactory sold its independent 
accounting marketing department 100 cases (250 cartons per case) cigarettes for RMB 50 per carton.  
Before the transfer pricing: the payable cigarette consumption tax:  70 × 250 × 100 × 40% = RMB 700,000. 
After the transfer pricing: the payable cigarette consumption tax:  50 × 250 × 100 × 40% = RMB 500,000.  
Difference between before and after transfer pricing:  700,000 – 500,000 = RMB 200,000.  
The transfer pricing reduced RMB 200,000 tax burden of the manufactory. 
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industry, the Chinese government carried out the third reform on the tobacco 
tax. This was an adjustment of taxation method and tax rate on cigarette excise 
tax. It implements a compound taxation method, combines a specific excise tax 
and an ad valorem tax, i.e.: 
υ Taxation according to quantity, a specific excise tax of RMB 150 per 
case; 
υ Taxation according to price, the cigarette tax was revised from three 
into two tax rate：a 45% tax rate for cigarette with an appropriation 
price higher than or equal to RMB 50 per carton and a 30% tax rate for 
cigarette with an appropriation price less than RMB 50 per carton. 
This reform reduced the excise tax rate of the top-grade cigarette from 
50% to 45%, enhanced the excise tax rate of the low-grade cigarette from 25% 
to 30%. A specific excise tax was introduced on cigarette for the first time, at a 
fixed tax of RMB 150 per case. This increased significantly the tax of the 
low-grade cigarette. 
This adjustment did not have huge impact on large cigarette 
manufacturers which produce mainly medium- and top-grade cigarette. But the 
small and medium cigarette manufacturers which produce mainly low-grade 
cigarettes suffered serious losses. Many of them had to shut down and to get 
out of the market. 
In addition to the adjustments of taxation method and tax rate, the taxable 
price was adjusted from “factory price” to “an appropriation price or an 
authorized price2”. This reduced the tax avoidance space of the tobacco 
enterprises to a certain extent. 
                                                        
2 An appropriation price refers to the mutually agreed trading price through the cigarette market between 
the cigarette manufacturer and the purchaser. It is determined by the State Administration of Taxation 
according to the last year’s appropriation price on various brand and specification of cigarette in China’s 
tobacco trading center (www.tobt.com.cn) and the provincial tobacco trade fairs. The others excluded in 
China’s tobacco trading center and the trade fairs are priced by the tax authorities through the reverse 
calculation of their marketing retail prices. 
  20
This reform of the tobacco tax again affected the cigarette product 
structure. It resulted in oversupply of top-grade cigarettes and in shortage of 
low-grade cigarettes. And the shortage of the low-grade cigarette in the market 
also provided a living environment for the illegal and counterfeit cigarettes. 
This had made an unfavorable impact on the healthy development of China’s 
tobacco industry. 
4.4. The latest reform of China’s tobacco tax 
The Chinese government has adjusted China’s tobacco tax for the fourth 
time in May 2009. The latest adjustment was restricted to the cigarette excise 
tax, and still focused on the production and wholesale links: 
? At the cigarette production link adjusted both the taxable price and the ad 
valorem tax rate. And the new bottom taxable prices are authorized and 
issued by the State Administration of Taxation (SAT). 
υ The ad valorem tax rate: the tax rate of the class A cigarette rose 56% 
from the previous 45%; the tax rate of the class B cigarette rose from 
30% to 36%; the tax of the cigars rose from 25% to 36%. 
υ The classification standard of the cigarette has been adjusted: the 
dividing line between the class A and B cigarette went up from RMB 50 
to RMB 70, i.e. the appropriation price equal to or higher than RMB 70 
per carton (excl. VAT) is class A cigarette; less than RMB 70 per carton 
is class B cigarette. 
? Meanwhile an ad valorem tax, levied at the wholesale link, was introduced 
on the tobacco products for the first time, at 5%.  
According to the information from STMA showed: in 2009, the tax and 
profits of industry and commerce on the tobacco industry for the first time 
exceeded RMB 500 billion, achieved RMB 513.11 billion, grew 12.% year on 
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year, in which the tax fee achieved RMB 416.34 billion, the year to year growth 
was RMB 86.42 billion, increased 26.2%. The growth of 26.2% on the tax fee 
largely depended on the increase of the tobacco tax rate. 
However, the RMB 513.11 billion profits and taxes of industry and 
commerce on the tobacco industry did not bring down the house. Instead, 
because the increase of the tobacco tax did not reduce the tobacco 
consumption and the smoking rate, the associations for the tobacco control at 
home and abroad and some experts questioned the earning way of the tobacco 
industry. 
The international experiences showed that increasing the tobacco tax, on 
the one hand can increase the financial revenue to enrich the state treasury; on 
the other hand it can raise the cigarette price, so that smokers reduce the 
tobacco consumption. The World Health Organization (WHO) recommended 
also using the tobacco tax to control the tobacco consumption. But this method 
was useless in China.  
Then, what was the significance of the increase on the tobacco tax in 2009? 
Experts agreed that “profitable state revenue and weak tobacco control” was 
the best summary.  
Why did China increase the tobacco tax, but the cigarette price stood still? 
Why was the most internationally regarded effectual means of tobacco control 
useless in China? For these special phenomena, I will analyze in detail in the 
next chapter. 
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5. Influences of the China’s tobacco excise increase in 
2009 
All along China’s tobacco tax has been low. Before the latest increase of 
the tobacco excise tax, the cigarette tax rate was about 40% of the retail price, 
much lower than the international median tax rate, which amounts to 65% – 
70% of the retail price. 
In May 2009, the Ministry of Finance and the State Administration of 
Taxation (SAT) jointly said, an ad valorem tax went up on cigarette carton 
costing RMB 70 or more to 56% from the previous 45% rate, and another ad 
valorem tax for cigarette carton costing less than RMB 70 rose from 30% to 
36%. The tax on cigars rose to 36% from 25%.  
Meanwhile an ad valorem tax, based on the real value (less inflation 
factors) of the product at the wholesale link, was introduced on tobacco 
products for the first time, at 5%. 
After the tax increase, the tobacco tax rose to 48.7% from the previous 
40% of the retail price, but it is still much lower than the international tobacco 
tax. Thus, there is ample room for China to raise the tax on cigarettes. 
There are three points for this time adjustment on the tobacco tax: 
First, the tax rates were raised. 
Cigarettes are classified into class A and B in China. This reform of the 
tobacco tax increased the tax rate of each class cigarette. The class A rose to 
56%, and class B to 36%. 
Second, the classification standard of the cigarette was changed.  
The dividing line of cigarette class was changed to RMB 70 instead of RMB 
50, equal to or higher than RMB 70 per carton is the class A cigarette, less than 
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RMB 70 is the class B. 
Such a change was attacked, and considered as a “conspiracy”: in fact, 
because the dividing line changed to RMB 70 from RMB 50, the previous class 
A cigarettes in the range of RMB 50 ~ 70 per carton were set to the class B. This 
means that the tax rate in the range of RMB 50 ~ 70 per carton not only did not 
rise, but also decreased to 36% from 45%, thus by 9%. 
Third, the retail price of the cigarette remained unchanged.  
Through the observation of China’s tobacco retail market it was discovered 
that the retail prices of the cigarette, except for a few top-grade cigarettes, 
remained constant after the tobacco tax increase. 
5.1. With the move up of tobacco tax the Government 
makes bigger profit. 
 There are at least two aspects that should be affected by the move up of 
the tobacco tax. One is the national tax revenue, the other is the smoking 
control which is closely related to the consumption behavior. 
According to a survey made by the World Bank in 2001: if the tobacco 
excise tax increased, the cigarette price would consequently move up as well, 
however, the cigarette consumption would drop down. As the range of the 
consumption decline was usually less than that of the increase of the price, in 
general the national tax revenue rises. The survey also indicated that it’s easier 
for the government to collect the cigarette tax by monitoring strictly the output. 
Thus, in virtue of the rise of the tax rate the overall state tax revenue would not 
drop down though the cigarette consumption declined. 
In fact, many countries’ government have regarded it an efficient means to 
increase the revenue by moving up the tobacco tax rate. For example in 
Canada as long as the government raised the tobacco tax the state revenue 
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would increase significantly; and whenever the state government of the United 
States was in shortage of money the first that comes to its mind was the 
tobacco business. 
In the year of 2009, besides China, Ukraine, Iceland, Greece and Thailand 
all raised the tobacco tax rate. The UK even had made double rise. The United 
States raised the tobacco tax from 39 cents per pack to 1.01 US dollar, which 
was the greatest adjustment in its history. 
Before May 2009 when the Chinese government announced to adjust the 
tobacco tax, China’s financial revenue had experienced seven consecutive 
months negative growth year-on-year, and meanwhile the government 
increased its expenditures sharply in order to stimulate the economy. The 
treasury had experienced huge pressure. The aim of easing the financial 
pressure was obviously see as to why the Chinese government chose to 
introduce this new tobacco excise tax policy at this moment. Actually, it was 
already evident in increasing the financial revenue. The taxes and profits on the 
tobacco industry achieved RMB 513.11 billion in 2009, in which the tax fee 
covered RMB 416.34 billion, grew 26.2% year-on-year. 
5.2. Tobacco tax moved up: the smoking control turned to 
be weak 
Increasing the tobacco tax has been regarded as the most effective way to 
reduce the tobacco consumption worldwide. But, there are some prerequisites 
on this that is the increased tax finally would be reflected in the price. Unless 
smoking becomes more expensive, cigarette consumption will not be reduced.  
A World Bank survey showed that cigarette consumption would be reduced 
by 4% in developed countries, and by 8% in developing countries, if the 
cigarette price increased by 10%. And the survey emphasized the important 
role that the tobacco tax increase has played to reduce the smoking of 
  25
teenagers. Due to their weak economic capability, young people are more 
sensitive to the cigarette price. If the cigarette price is raised by 10%, the same 
proportion of the young people will reduce smoking. More importantly, the 
higher price will prevent some young people from smoking who never did it 
before. 
As a matter of fact there had been many successful cases in the world 
about controlling the tobacco consumption by raising the tax3:  A U.S. statistic   
showed that 7.9% to 12% of the young people would reduce buying cigarettes, 
if the tobacco tax were raised by 10%;  and a survey from Hong Kong indicated 
that there are two main reasons for quitting smoking: one is the personal health, 
and the other is the financial burden; in 1983, the British authorities in Hong 
Kong had a huge increase in tobacco tax by 300%, the number of the smoking 
population immediately decreased by 20%. The effect was obvious, so was it in 
Canada and the United Kingdom. Hence the World Health Organization (WHO) 
more than ten years ago had called for its members to increase the tobacco tax 
preventing the teenagers from buying cigarettes. 
A report (Hu et al. 2008) assessed the potential impact of raising cigarette 
taxes on the smoking prevalence rate, number of lives saved, and government 
tax revenue in China. By simulation resulted that adding an excise tax of 1 RMB 
per pack, assuming a total price elasticity of -0.50, the prevalence rate of 
smoking would be reduced further from 30% to 28.67%, or in other words, 
reduction of 13.7 million smokers. Using the estimated epidemiology analysis 
reported by the 1999 World Bank report, assuming 25% of smokers will die 
from tobacco-related illness, an additional 1 RMB specific excise tax would 
mean 3.42 million lives could be saved, and would increase government 
revenue by RMB 64.9 billion, reduce medical costs by RMB 2.68 billion and 
generate a productivity gain of RMB 9.92 billion for the Chinese economy. 
However, after China increased the tobacco tax, the expected 
                                                        
3 http://biz.16888.com.cn/20096/24155018.html 
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consumption drop-down did not show up. The market feedback was that, apart 
from a few top-grade cigarettes, most of the tobacco products’ wholesale and 
retail prices had not changed. In other words, the new tax policy did not raise 
the cigarette price, so that the smokers did not have more economic pressure. 
Therefore they lacked the motivation to quit smoking or to smoke less. 
The adjustment of the tobacco tax did not cause the linkage of the tax and 
the price, because the tax changed, but the price did not. Cigarette 
consumption was not affected, thus no tobacco control effect emerged.  
5.3. Reasons for the unchanged cigarette price 
From a global perspective, every time when the government raised the 
tobacco tax, the tobacco companies would react quickly to add the cigarette 
price. But, why the cigarette price stood still after the rise in China? 
5.3.1. The tobacco monopoly controls the price 
Although Chinese government had gone through several reforms on 
tobacco management system the tobacco industry has remained one of the 
least marketized. Under the “Law of the Peoples Republic of China on Tobacco 
Monopoly”, China implements the monopoly system under the unified 
leadership. Such system determined the basic features of the monopoly on the 
tobacco industry that is everything, from planting the purchasing of the tobacco 
leaf to the production, sales and management of the tobacco is unexceptionally 
determined by the government. And of course the cigarette price is set by the 
government as well.  
In short, STMA (CNTC) has the pricing power. Due to China’s tobacco 
monopoly system, the tobacco manufacturers and retailers do not have the 
right to raise the tobacco price. For protecting their own interests, STMA and 
CNTC would not allow a decline in the number of smokers and in tobacco 
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consumption because of the price increase on tobacco. In order to maintain the 
stability of the tobacco consumption, they wanted to keep a constant tobacco 
price. 
5.3.2. The high monopoly profits, the tax increase was 
internally absorbed 
Here, I use an example of the most popular cigarette “Jin Huang Dihao” in 
province Henan to explain the distribution of the monopoly earnings on the 
tobacco industry: 
The retail price of a case of “Jin Huang Dihao” is RMB 25,000. Its cost is 
about RMB 6,225. The gross profit is RMB 18,775, in which the tobacco 
manufactory earned RMB 8,652, the commercial link (CNTC) earned RMB 
5,223, as the tax was levied RMB 8,652, and the tobacco retailers earned RMB 
2,400. I.e. the tobacco manufactory and the retail link each account for 13%, 
CNTC 28% and the taxation 46%. Obviously, apart from the taxation, CNTC 
took a large part of the earnings. 
China’s tobacco monopoly system grants a monopoly to the tobacco 
industry. And monopoly pricing resulted in a high monopoly rent. Because of 
the large profit margin, even if the tobacco tax was raised, CNTC could still 
convert a part of the profit in to the tax revenue so as to ensure the price 
unchanged. This implies that the tax increase was internally absorbed by the 
tobacco industry. 
In fact, this is an important business strategy of CNTC, i.e. using the profit 
of the expensive cigarette to subsidize the cheap cigarette. Through this way to 
keep the low price of the cheap cigarette, so as to do its utmost to maintain the 
number of the smokers and the tobacco consumption. 
From another perspective, this also showed that this tobacco tax increase 
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was not enough. The tobacco industry had still the ability to absorb this part of 
the tax within the industry. Even after the tax adjustment, compared with the 
international tobacco rate, there is still room for China to raise the tobacco tax in 
the future.  
5.3.3. Changed the classification standard of the cigarette, the 
tax of a part of cigarette declined 
As I mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, the border of China’s class 
A and B cigarettes was changed to RMB 70 from RMB 50. This change resulted 
directly in a reclassification of cigarettes in the range of RMB 50 ~ 70 per carton 
from class A to class B. Therefore, even though the rate of each class cigarette 
was raised, actually the excise tax in the range of RMB 50 ~ 70 dropped by 9%. 
The reason for this phenomenon, to tell the truth, was the result of a game 
between the interest-relevant department of the tobacco industry and the 
taxation department. In other words, it’s the tobacco-related departments that 
resisted the increase of the tobacco tax in disguise. 
As the integration of the government functions and enterprise 
management China’s tobacco monopoly system on one hand gained huge 
profits for tobacco manufactories, and on the other hand has had great impact 
on the government’s macroeconomic strategy. The largest tobacco enterprise – 
CNTC, actually is another identity of the government authority (STMA). 
Knowing this we can understand why the cigarette classification standard 
was changed as well when the cigarette excise tax was raised in 2009. This not 
only satisfied the governments’ needs for the financial revenue, but also 
protected the interests of the tobacco industry. 
All in all, the reasons why the price of China tobacco does not increase with 
the rise of the tax are that under the tobacco monopoly system the tobacco 
industry has a huge profit margin and that in some circumstances part of tax for 
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cigarette actually decreased. Due to these two factors the tobacco industry 
itself was able to absorb the impact brought forth by the tax increase. This is to 
say that the monopoly system leaves no room at all for China’s tobacco industry 
to make free marketing choice since usually a price increase should follow 
higher taxes. 
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6. China’s tobacco taxation system influenced the 
action of local government 
In China’s current collection and distribution system of the tobacco taxation, 
the local government got huge tax revenues from the tobacco industry. Thus, it 
caused the local governments, especially the local governments of the major 
tobacco producing areas, to have the over-dependence of finance revenue on 
the tobacco industry. The over-dependence led to some unreasonable acts of 
the local government, such as: through administrative intervention forced 
farmers to plant tobacco leaves; the local protectionism, etc. Next, I will be 
taking Yunnan Province, the China’s biggest tobacco producing areas, as an 
example, to further elaborate. 
6.1. Interventions of the local government on China’s 
tobacco industry 
6.1.1. The local government intervening in tobacco leaf 
planting 
1. The costs and risks of the tobacco leaf planting are high, the cost-profit rate 
of the tobacco leaf continued declining, and the farmers did not want to grow 
the tobacco leaves. 
① The cost-profit rate of the tobacco leaf was at a disadvantage compared to 
other crops in tobacco producing areas. Take China’s biggest flue-cured 
tobacco4 production base, Qujing City, Yunnan Province, as an example: 
                                                        
4 Tobacco could be divided into flue-cured tobacco, sun-cured tobacco, burley tobacco, oriental tobacco and cigar 
tobacco etc. The flue-cured tobacco war originally strung onto tobacco sticks, which were hung from tier-poles in 
curing barns. These barns have flues which run from externally fed fire boxes, heat-curing the tobacco without 
exposing it to smoke, slowly raising the temperature over the course of the curing. The process will generally take 
about a week (Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curing_of_tobacco). 
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Table 2: The production cost and profit of Qujing City’s  
               main grain and economic crops in 2007     Unit: Yuan / Mu5 
Item Unit Japonica 
rice 
Flue-cured 
tobacco 
Rapeseed Potato 
Total output 
value 
Yuan 942.05 1551.12 565.14 1475.67 
Total costs Yuan 766.11 1556.43 369.96 969.58 
Net profits Yuan 175.94 -5.13 195.18 506.09 
Cash costs Yuan 270.08 769.76 177.13 616.54 
 Cash earnings Yuan 617.97 781.36 388.01 859.13 
Cost-profit rate % 22.97 -0.33 52.76 52.20 
Source: Qujing Municipal Commission of Development and Reform: “The data 
collection of Qujing City’s main agricultural products cost-earnings” 
② The cost of flue-cured tobacco continued increasing, and its cost-profit rate 
decreased, the tobacco growers had only meager profits (see Table 3).  
③ The tobacco growers have to take a huge risk in the whole growing and 
preliminary processing links. 
Because of the weather and terrain factors, the major tobacco producing 
areas are frequently affected by hail disasters. Compared to other crops, the 
flue-cured tobacco has weak resistance to hail disaster. In case it suffers from a 
hail disaster, usually half or even the whole of the harvest is lost. Moreover, the 
tobacco leaf curing makes a high request for the technology and experience of 
the tobacco growers. A slightest mistake would affect directly the grade of the 
tobacco leaf. 
                                                        
5 Yuan: RMB currency units, 1 US Dollar ≈ 6.76 Yuan 
   Mu: a unit of area, 1 Mu = 0.0667 Hectares 
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Table 3: Comparison between the years 2007 and 2004, 2005 and 2006  
on the flue-cured tobacco costs and benefits 
Item Unit 2004 2005 2006 2007 Comp. 
07 & 
04(%)
Comp. 
07 & 
05(%) 
Comp. 
07 & 
06(%)
Average 
price 
Yuan
/kg 
11.05 11.46 11.54 11.75 6.30 2.50 1.78 
Total costs Yuan
/kg 
1059.05 1259.63 1338.12 1527.19 44.20 21.24 14.30 
Material 
and 
service 
costs 
Yuan 
/Mu 
433.2 556.50 595.69 742.49 71.39 33.42 24.64 
Labor 
costs 
Yuan
/Mu 
556.16 578.83 613.99 634.88 14.15 8.00 3.40 
Land costs Yuan
/Mu 
69.67 115.30 126.44 150.14 115.50 30.22 18.74 
profits Yuan
/Mu 
381.16 284.50 209.42 -6.57 -101.7 -102.3 -103.1
Cash 
costs 
Yuan
/Mu 
438.01 562.18 603.72 765.42 74.75 36.15 26.78 
Cash 
earnings 
Yuan
/Mu 
1002.2 981.95 941.64 755.50 -24.62 -23.06 -19.77
Cost-profit 
rate 
% 35.99 22.59 15.66 -0.42 -101.2 -101.9 -102.7
Source: Qujing Municipal Commission of Development and Reform: “The data 
collection of Qujing City’s main agricultural products cost-earnings” 
2. The taxes related to the tobacco industry brought huge revenue to the local 
governments, caused the local governments through administrative means to 
urge farmers to grow tobacco leaves.  
On the one hand, “tobacco leaf tax”, “city construction and maintenance 
tax” and “education surtax”, etc. local government taxes support the local 
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government revenue; on the other hand, the local government can also share 
the central and local government sharing taxes and the central government 
taxes, such as: “VAT”, “enterprise income tax” and “consumption tax”, etc. 
Therefore, some local governments disregarded the wishes of the farmers and 
urged them to plant tobacco. For example, the tobacco leaf purchasing station 
by CNTC asked farmers to plant tobacco leaves. If farmer grew other crops, the 
local government would force them pulling out. The local STMA also confirmed 
that the tobacco leaf planting is planned, controlled and managed by 
government. The size of the tobacco leaf planting areas is regulated. To ensure 
the number of the tobacco leaf planting, sometimes mandatory measures were 
needed. 
6.1.2．The local government intervening in cigarette production  
Because the cigarette excise tax is collected at the production link, the 
revenue earnings of the cigarette production region are much more than 
cigarette marketing region. The local government paid more attention to the 
cigarette production than to the tobacco business or other industries, even did a 
lot of administrative intervention on the cigarette manufactories. Actually, they 
played a role of encouraging production and inhibiting circulation on the 
cigarette.  
Because the cigarette excise tax is paid by the cigarette manufactories at 
the production link, the cigarette output became an important factor which 
decides how many disposable financial revenues can have the local 
governments. Driven by local interests, the local governments of the tobacco 
producing areas applied more administrative intervention and protection on the 
local tobacco enterprises, blockaded the local cigarette market, developed 
local cigarette brands, put up barriers to prevent foreign cigarettes from 
entering the local market. It can be said that the close ties between the tobacco 
taxation and the local financial revenue directly caused the rise of local 
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protectionism. 
6.2. The “tobacco dependence” of the local government – 
an analysis on the tobacco industry relevant tax items 
1. Tobacco leaf tax 
The tobacco leaf tax revenue belongs to the local government. It always 
becomes the backbone of the local tax revenue, because the development of 
the commodity economy is always lagging behind in most of tobacco producing 
areas. In addition, during the purchasing of the tobacco leaves, the purchasing 
stations are centralized, not only low costs but also high efficiency. It benefits 
the local tax authorities to collect and manage. 
2. Consumption tax 
Although the consumption tax is a central government tax, the central 
government every year must return a part of the tax revenue to the local 
governments. Whether they can get the tax return and how much they can get, 
depends on the growth of the local “two taxes” (VAT and consumption tax). 
Therefore, this means that, the higher consumption tax revenue, the more tax 
return the local government can get. 
The tobacco producing areas are always China’s central and western 
economically underdeveloped areas. The huge consumption tax paid by the 
tobacco industry is a major part of the local consumption tax revenue. In order 
to facilitate the collection and management, China’s tobacco consumption 
taxes are levied at the production link. This led the local governments of the 
tobacco producing areas to depend on tobacco consumption.  
3. VAT 
The revenues from VAT are shared between the central and local 
government. The central share is 75% and the local share is 25%. Like the 
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consumption tax, the collection of the VAT has a close bearing on the tax return, 
and also has a direct influence on the disposable revenue of the local 
government. 
Table 4: Comparison between “two taxes” revenue of cigarette and the 
total tax revenue in Yunnan Province (years 1994 - 2005) 
year Total central and 
local tax (100 Mio. 
Yuan) 
“Two taxes” revenue 
on cigarette  
(100 Mio. Yuan) 
Proportion of “two 
taxes” to total tax 
revenue  
1994 266.79 155.57 58.3% 
1995 289.44 164.14 56.7% 
1996 328.66 171.96 52.3% 
1997 355.97 180.52 50.7% 
1998 406.72 207.46 51.7% 
1999 412.42 219.31 53.2% 
2000 424.97 210.74 49.6% 
2001 423.01 194.97 46.1% 
2002 453.29 209.79 46.3% 
2003 491.96 224.92 45.7% 
2004 604.35 268.52 44.4% 
2005 676.78 265.80 39.3% 
Source: Yunnan Province Office, State Administration Taxation 
4. Enterprise income tax 
The tobacco enterprise should pay the enterprise income tax according to 
the 25% of their taxable income. The enterprise tax is a tax shared between the 
central and local government, each of which accounts for 50%. 
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5. City maintenance and construction tax and education surtax 
Both are local government taxes, their tax basis is the sum of the 
consumption tax, VAT and business tax. As the tobacco industry created huge 
consumption tax and VAT revenues, the city maintenance and construction tax 
and education surtax, which are collected by the local government from the 
tobacco industry, support largely the urban construction and education 
expenditure of the local government. 
6.3. The harms of the local government’s interventions on 
the tobacco industry 
First, the tobacco leaf tax brought great tax revenue to the local 
governments. In order to get more tobacco leaf tax revenue, they overdid the 
administrative interventions in the tobacco leaf planting. This harmed directly 
the interests of farmers. They were deprived of the right to free choosing crops 
to grow. Meanwhile, forcing farmers to plant tobacco leaf often caused that yield 
of the tobacco leaf exceeded the CNTC quotas. The farmers had to sell their 
leftover tobacco leaves to underground private cigarette manufactories for 
counterfeit cigarettes.  
Second, as the local government can share the huge tobacco tax revenue 
with the central government, the local governments are willing to support those 
tobacco enterprises with low benefits, so that they can benefit from the tobacco 
tax revenue. Over attention, intervention and protection of the local government 
on the tobacco enterprise interfered directly with the regular production and 
operation of these enterprises, caused the rise of the local protectionism and 
hindered the formation of a unified national tobacco market. Tobacco 
enterprises could not create economies of scale. This has undermined the 
competitiveness of China’s tobacco industry. 
Third, local governments of the tobacco producing areas depend much on 
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tobacco taxation. The main reason is that the local economies are incompletely 
developed. The local governments could not receive sufficient revenue support 
in the other economic sectors or industries. But if the local governments 
through the growth of the tobacco taxation were able to meet the needs of 
financial expenditure, complete the task of taxes to obtain more tax return from 
the central government, the local governments would increase their 
dependence on the tobacco taxation. They would lack the motivation to develop 
other industries, the local economy would still develop lopsidedly – the tobacco 
industry is unique outshining and other industries develop slowly. This is a 
vicious circle. 
Therefore, only decreasing the tax benefits which the local governments 
obtain from the tobacco taxation can reduce their over-dependence of the tax 
revenue on the tobacco tax, so as to reduce and even completely eliminate the 
unreasonable interventions of the local government on the tobacco industry. 
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7. The tobacco tax and the tobacco control in China 
7.1. Framework Convention on Tobacco Control and China 
WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC) is the first 
legal global public health treaty and is the first worldwide multilateral agreement 
on the tobacco. 
In the convention WHO urged all governments to raise the price of tobacco 
products by the means of tax charge. To reduce tobacco consumption by 
raising the price of tobacco is an important provision which all governments are 
requested to perform. 
Each member country of the WHO FCTC is committed to ensure the health 
of its people protected by joining the tobacco control. To assist its members in 
fulfilling the commitment, WHO has announced a policy called “MPOWER”, a 
package of six tobacco control measures (WHO 2008): 
 “M”, monitor tobacco use and prevention policies; “P”, protect people from 
smoking; “O”, offer help to quit tobacco use; “W”, warn about the dangers; “E”, 
enforce bans on tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship; “R”, raise 
taxes on tobacco. 
The tobacco control measures can be either economic or non-economic. 
The real economic measure of the tobacco control can be “R”, i.e. raise taxes 
on tobacco. To raise the tobacco tax means that the tobacco price might be 
increased. The economic measure can reduce the tobacco consumption. 
MPOWER quoted data from South Africa: “cigarette consumption fell by 5% to 
7% for every 10% increase in the price of cigarettes, resulting in a sharp decline 
in consumption, with the largest smoking decreases among the young and the 
poor” (WHO 2008). MPOWER said that taxation is the best way to cut tobacco 
use. 
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The Chinese government signed the WHO FCTC in 2003. And approved 
by the National People’s Congress the treaty came into effect in January 2006. 
According to the convention, by 2011, smoking shall be restricted at all indoor 
public places, indoor workplaces, public transportation and other possible 
public places. A totally non-smoking environment has to be achieved. 
7.2. Analysis of the efficiency on the tobacco control 
through tax 
Because of the addictive nature of cigarette many people distinctively think 
that smoking has nothing or little to do with the cigarette price. People 
consequently judge that it may not be a good idea to control the tobacco use by 
raising the tax. However, the price is actually a truly important factor in the 
decision of smoking or not. Among the existing smokers, the influence caused 
by price change is differentiated by the incomes, ages, and some people are 
greatly influenced by the price. 
7.2.1．An analysis on the efficiency of tobacco control through 
tax based on the price elasticity  
Whether the high price caused by the taxation can restrain the 
consumption relies a lot on the price elasticity of demand. As the price elasticity 
of the demand for tobacco products is great, the high price caused by the high 
tax is effective for the tobacco control. 
1. The price elasticity of smoking participation and the price elasticity of 
smoking 
The price elasticity of demand on the tobacco product can be divided into 
the price elasticity of smoking participation and the price elasticity of smoking. 
The price elasticity of smoking participation means the influence degree of the 
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price as people make the decision whether to start smoking; the price elasticity 
of smoking means the influence degree of the price on smoking after people 
have already started smoking. 
The price plays an important role when people make a decision whether to 
start smoking, therefore, the price elasticity of smoking participation is larger. In 
contrast, to those who have been smoking, the price has less influence on their 
smoking. The price elasticity of smoking participation was estimated between 
-0.17 ~ -0.54, and the price elasticity of smoking was between -0.10 ~ -0.22 in 
developed countries. The price elasticity of smoking participation was 
estimated by -0.89, and the price elasticity of smoking was -0.18 in China (Mao 
1997). 
This showed that the price has more influence on whether to start smoking 
in China than in developed countries. To those who have been smoking, due to 
the addiction, the price has little impact on smoking both in China and in other 
countries. 
Therefore, although the high price with the high tax has little impact on the 
smoking of the addicts, it plays a positive role in discouraging people from 
starting to smoke. From this perspective, the high tax can help to control the 
tobacco use. 
2. The price elasticity of demand of the different groups for the tobacco 
product 
① Different income groups 
The price elasticity of demand is closely related with a person’s income. 
The price elasticity of the demand of the lower income group is greater. And 
their demands are more easily affected by the price change, the opposite for 
the high income group. Mao et al. (2005) had estimated the price elasticity of 
demand of China’s different income groups for cigarettes, the result in table 2: 
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Table 5: The price elasticity of demand of 
 China’s different income groups for cigarettes 
Groups  
 
Price elasticity   
Poor  
group 
Low 
income 
group 
Middle 
income 
group 
High 
income 
group 
Price elasticity of 
smoking 
participation 
-0.692 -0.286 0.131 0.441 
Price elasticity of 
smoking -0.111 -0.035 -0.111 -0.083 
The annual average income:  
Poor group: less than RMB 5000; Low income group: RMB 5000 ~ 10000; 
Middle income group: RMB 10000 ~ 50000; High income group: more than 
RMB 50000. 
The price elasticity of smoking participation of the poor and low income 
groups is negative, which means that the increase of the price would reduce 
their smoking participation. The lower income the people have, the more 
sensitive to the price they will be. A price increase would significantly reduce 
the smoking participation of the poor and the low income groups. The price 
elasticity of smoking participation of the middle and high income groups is 
positive, meaning that an increase of the price would rather raise their smoking 
participation. The more income the people have, the higher is the smoking 
participation probability as the pricing increases. 
The data also showed that, to whichever of these groups, the price 
elasticity of smoking is negative, which means that the increase of the cigarette 
price would reduce the smoking of various group. 
The World Bank’s research report (1999) showed that the smoking rate of 
the poor and the less educated is higher than of those who are wealthier and 
better educated, around the world. A Chinese survey (Zhang 2006) showed 
that the low-grade cigarette consumption accounted for 62.58% of the total 
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rural cigarette consumption in 2005. According to a survey of the cigarette 
consumption in Beijing Market (2005), in Beijing’s cigarette consumption 
groups, low-grade cigarette consumption groups accounted for 75%, top-grade 
cigarette consumption groups just accounted for 5%; the sales of the low-grade 
cigarette accounted for 31% of the total sales, the middle-grade was 68% and 
the top-grade was only 1%. It is thus clear that the low income group accounts 
for most of the smokers in China. Accordingly, the price elasticity of demand for 
the tobacco product is greater. 
② Different age groups 
Gruber (2002) found that, in the 1980s, in the US, the smoking rate of the 
teenagers dropped sharply after the raising of the cigarette price. When the 
cigarette price declined, the smoking rate of the teenagers rose rapidly. In the 
1990s, when the price increased again, the smoking rate of the teenagers 
dropped very fast again. He estimated that the price elasticity of demand of the 
teenagers for the cigarette was -0.66 which was about three times the price 
elasticity of the adult smokers. 
Mao et al. (2002) showed that the price had an obvious influence on the 
demand of the teenagers for the cigarette in China. The price elasticity of 
smoking participation was -1.15, and the price elasticity of smoking was -0.46, 
much higher than the adult smokers. All the research results showed that using 
the tax to control the tobacco use can effectively protect the teenagers from 
starting to smoke and reduce the smoking of the young people. 
3. The general price elasticity for tobacco product 
Frank et al. (1999) studied the price elasticity of demand for tobacco 
products and obtained the following estimates for the general price elasticity of 
demand for tobacco: the wide range was -0.14 ~ -1.23, the narrow range was 
-0.3 ~ -0.5. Bai et al. (2005) according to data from 30 provinces of the Chinese 
mainland (excl. Tibet), obtained China’s price elasticity of demand for the 
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cigarette as -0.852, in which the less developed areas was -0.962, the medium 
developed areas was -0.957, and the developed areas was -0.722. 
From what has been discussed above, all of the studies showed that using 
the high tax to cause the high price could have an effective effect on the 
tobacco control. 
7.2.2. The experience worldwide proved the application of the 
tobacco control through tax  
The price increase of the tobacco product resulted in the decline of the 
tobacco consumption. This rule applies to both the developed and the 
developing countries. 
In Canadian data (Beyer and Brigden 2003), during 1985–1991, the 
“Tobacco Tax Plan” caused the increase of the tobacco price, led to a drop of 
40% in domestic sales in which the average cigarette consumption of 
teenagers decreased by 60%. In 1979, 42% of teenagers between 15 and 19 
were habitual smokers, but in 1991, the proportion fell to 16%. The South 
Korean statistics showed that the average price of a pack cigarette had risen by 
50% since 2005 the government had raised the tax rate of the cigarette. After 
three months, the smoking rate decreased to 53.3% from 57.8%, and six 
months later, decreased to 52.3%6.  
7.2.3. The price elasticity of the top-grade cigarette in China 
It is to be noted that China’s top-grade cigarette consumption is quite 
different from that of other countries. Most of these top-grade cigarettes are 
used as the gift consumption or government consumption, i.e. buy the 
top-grade cigarettes as gifts or using the public funds to buy the top-grade 
cigarette. This ironically means that, “smokers do not buy, and buyer do not 
                                                        
6 http://www.yan.la/xinwen/guoji/yaowen/20091214-11706.html 
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smoke”. When purchasing top-grade cigarettes, few people would care about 
the high price. The price elasticity for the top-grade cigarette is small. And it 
goes even further - the higher the price is, the more are consumed. Thus, 
although a few top-grade cigarettes increased the price after the Chinese 
government had raised the tobacco tax, sales were not affected. Therefore, it is 
very difficult to control the consumption of the top-grade cigarette just by raising 
tax. 
7.3. A survey of raising tobacco tax in China 
In 2009 a public survey7 was conducted nationwide in China for the 
purpose of knowing how the public think about raising the tobacco tax. This 
survey was executed by a research team namely “Study of Chinese Cigarette 
Tax” which was formed by Tsinghua University, Ministry of Finance People’s 
Republic of China and Harvard University. The survey result showed that the 
public had a clear understanding about the hazards of smoking and supported 
the tobacco control by tax increase. 
7.3.1. The public had a clear understanding in the China’s 
tobacco consumption and the hazards of smoking 
The residents had a basic understanding of China’s tobacco production 
and sales which are the largest in the world. The majority of the public thought 
that smoking has caused serious hazards to public health, and smoking of 
teenagers is a serious social problem. Meanwhile, over 90% of the 
non-smokers had hazards of passive smoking. 
                                                        
7 http://www.cmmr.com.cn/_d269715297.htm 
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7.3.2. The public highly support the tobacco tax increase 
Table 6: The public support and oppose rate 
 for the tobacco tax increase (%) 
Option Total Non-smoker Smoker 
Support rate 
(very support + support) 85.6 87.1 80.5 
Very support 65.5 67.9. 57.8 
support 20.1 19.2 22.7 
Indifferent 7.2 6.5 9.5 
Oppose rate 
(very oppose + oppose) 7.2 6.4 10.0 
Very oppose 4.1 3.3 6.4 
Oppose 3.2 3.0 3.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
The survey showed that more than 80% of the residents supported the 
increase in tobacco tax, in which “very support” accounted for 65.5%, and 
“support” accounted for 20.1%, clearly oppose to only 7.2%. And non-smokers 
supported the increase of the tobacco tax even more; the rate reached to 
87.1%, higher than the smokers 6.6%. The survey also found that the higher 
educated residents more supported the tobacco tax increase. The support rate 
of the urban residents was higher than the rural. Moreover, most of the 
residents supported using the increased tobacco tax to expand the medical 
insurance and the tobacco control etc. 
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7.3.3. The tobacco tax increase would restrain smoking 
effectively 
Smokers accounted for about 23.8% of the total respondents in this survey. 
The survey investigated the smokers’ responses for various degrees of the 
tobacco tax increase, aimed to understand whether the economic means of the 
tax can achieve the goal of controlling smoking. 
1. The higher the tax increased, the larger inhibiting effect for the smoking 
made. 
The survey result showed that, if a pack of cigarette increase by RMB 0.6 
after the tobacco tax is raised, 54.5% of the smokers would be willing to quit or 
reduce smoking; if the cigarette price is raised by RMB 2, 73.3% of the smokers 
would have the same intention; if the price is raised by RMB 10 or more, 88.6% 
of the smokers would be willing to quit or reduce smoking. 
2. Smokers with very little or with strong daily cigarette consumption are less 
sensitive to the cigarette price. 
Those who smoke little do not feel the cost increase. Therefore the 
cigarette price does not have a significant impact on their expenditure. And 
those who smoke often may find it difficult to reduce their smoking habit. 
3. The increase of the tobacco tax has a greater influence on the smokers who 
smoke low-grade cigarettes. 
Most of those smokers who smoke lower-grade cigarette are low income 
groups or teenagers. Thus, increasing taxes to reduce the smoking of the low 
income groups and of teenagers is more effective. 
4. The increase of the tobacco tax would cause a part of the smokers to smoke 
lower-grade cigarette. 
If a pack of cigarette price is raised by RMB 0.6, 10.5% of the smokers 
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would be willing to smoke lower-grade cigarette; if the price is raised by RMB 2, 
the proportion would rise to 17.3%. This showed that a “substitution effect” 
exists among the various grade cigarettes. Rural smokers have a more obvious 
“substitution effect” than urban smokers. Overall, the proportion of those who 
choose the lower-grade cigarette is not high. There, it has little impact on the 
total tobacco control. 
7.4. Two propositions on the tobacco control by raising tax  
7.4.1. Proposition 1 
Hu et al. (2008) proposed that the Chinese government should increase 
the specific excise tax from the previous RMB 0.6 per pack to RMB 1 per pack. 
They performed a simulation based on two different price elasticities (-0.15 and 
-0.50): 
“with a 1 RMB per pack tax increase … with a total price elasticity of -0.15, 
smoking participation elasticity would be -0.06, and the prevalence rate of 
smoking would be reduced from 30 percent to 29.6 percent, representing a 
reduction of 4.1 million smokers … assuming a total price elasticity of -0.50 (i.e. 
smoking participation elasticity at -0.20) … the prevalence rate of smoking 
would be reduced further 30 percent to 28.67 percent, or a reduction of 13.7 
million smokers …” 
That means “an increase in the specific excise tax of RMB 1 on a pack of 
cigarettes would increase government revenue by RMB 64.9 billion, save 3.4 
million lives, reduce medical costs by RMB 2.68 billion and generate a 
productivity gain of RMB 9.92 billion for the Chinese economy”. 
The proposal mainly called for “increasing the specific excise tax” to 
reduce the price difference between the high- and low-price cigarettes so as to 
restrain the people from smoking, in particular reduce the smoking of the low 
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income groups and teenagers, because they smoke mainly the low-price 
cigarette. 
7.4.2. Proposition 2 
This proposal had been formally submitted by “Study of Chinese Cigarette 
tax” task force to the Chinese government before China raised the tobacco tax 
in May 2009. The main idea was also by means of tax to control the tobacco 
use, and to reduce the price difference between the high- and low-price 
cigarettes, mainly included: 
υ Raising the ad valorem tax rate of the class B cigarette to the previous 
tax rate of the class A cigarette, i.e. the ad valorem tax of both class A 
and B cigarettes are by 45%. Increasing the specific excise tax of all 
cigarettes to RMB 0.3 per pack. Taken together, the retail price of a 
pack of cigarettes will increase by 17.7%. 
υ Collect the cigarette excise tax from the production link to the 
wholesale link. Because the regularization degree of the cigarette retail 
link in China is relative low, it is difficult to collect and manage the 
cigarette excise tax in the link, but in the wholesale link is fully 
operational. 
Both proposals of above discussed how to adjust the tobacco tax and price. 
Although different, the essences are the same, i.e.: the first is to increase tax; 
second, the increase of tax should be reflected in the cigarette price. The 
purposes and principles of the two proposals are the same, that is, through 
increasing the tax and the price to control the tobacco consumption.  
The two proposals both referred a concept of the “Earmarked Tax”, i.e. the 
increase of the finance revenue are earmarked for improving the people’s 
livelihood, such as increasing the healthcare, the tobacco control, etc. 
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Both the international voice and the wishes of the domestic public are 
urging China to accelerate the pace of the tobacco control. The international 
experiences showed that raising the tax is the best economic way for the 
tobacco control. After China’s increase of the tobacco tax in 2009, the 
government revenue increased obviously, but the tobacco control was useless 
(see Chapter 5). The main reason was that the tax changed but the price did not 
change. Therefore, how to further adjust the tobacco tax system? How to 
reform the current tobacco monopoly system, and to establish the linkage 
mechanism of the tax and the price make the tax policy to play a real role in the 
tobacco control? These are important issues which the Chinese government 
must think about and resolve in the future.  
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8. The WTO impact on China’s tobacco taxation 
China has implemented strict control on the import and export of tobacco 
products which resulted in less dependence on foreign trade. The development 
of Chinese tobacco basically relied on the domestic market. 
After joining the WTO, China’s tobacco industry is obliged to reduce tariffs, 
release and even dismantle tariff barriers, progressively open up the market 
and revise or renew the rules.  
Owning the largest amount of smoking population China has to become 
the most focused market of all the multinational tobacco companies. However, 
as the international competitiveness of China’s tobacco enterprises is relatively 
weak, it gives a great impact on China’s domestic tobacco market. Meanwhile, 
China’s traditional administrative system, the taxation system, the legal system 
and the enterprise system also have to be confronted with great challenges. 
8.1. Tariff policy 
China had always adopted a high tariff policy on imports of tobacco 
products. After joining the WTO China had a substantial reduction in import 
tariffs on variety of tobacco products. According to the commitments to WTO, 
China’s import tariff on cigarettes was reduced from previous 60% to 25% in 
2003, the import tariff of the tobacco leaf was reduced to 10% from 40% in 
2004. 
8.2. Consumption tax policy 
As China’s tobacco enterprises do not have economics of scale, probably 
they have to lose market shares to foreign multinational cigarette companies 
following the opening of the domestic market. Therefore, a higher tax rate will 
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be a good way to maintain the tobacco tax revenue when the production and 
sales of the domestic cigarettes reduce. 
China’s cigarette excise tax is the tax included in price8, the tax sharing is 
not clear. But in other countries is the tax excluded in price9. According to the 
WTO’s “Transparency” principle, it is most possible to change the tax included 
in price to the tax excluded in price and unify the tax rate, and then, to be a 
gradual transition to paying the excise tax in cigarette marketing regions. Speed 
up the innovation of tax system, as far as possible to eliminate local 
protectionism. 
8.3. Enterprise income tax policy 
Joint ventures have enjoyed favorable tax policies in the past dozen of 
years in China. In other words, for quite long time foreign companies have 
received the “Ultra-National Treatment”. Because of the difference of the two 
enterprise income tax policies, the enterprise income tax burden of foreign 
companies has always been much lower than Chinese enterprises. This is not 
conducive for the Chinese tobacco enterprises to compete with foreign ones. 
China’s accession to the WTO provided more opportunities for more new joint 
ventures, thus, to unify the enterprise income tax of the domestic and foreign 
enterprises is imperative. 
                                                        
8 & 8 ① Tax included in price: is undertaken by the seller. Price of goods which is obtained by sellers is the selling 
price, and the tax is to go with the selling price, in which the tax will be deducted. i.e. price of goods (inclusive tax) 
= selling price; tax = price of goods (selling price) × tax rate. 
② Tax excluded in price: is undertaken by the purchaser. Price of goods which is obtained by sellers consists of 
the selling price and the tax. i.e. price of goods = selling price + tax. Due to: tax = selling price × tax rate, and the 
price of goods (i.e. a tax-inclusive price) subtracts the tax, i.e. a tax-exclusive price, therefore, the tax = price of 
goods – selling price = price of goods – tax / tax rate. The resulting: 
Tax included in price = price of goods (selling price) × tax rate = a tax-inclusive price × tax rate 
Tax excluded in price = [price of goods / (1 + tax rate)] × tax rate = a tax-exclusive price × tax rate 
In most of the western countries, the consumption tax is the tax excluded in price, i.e. the buyer need to pay the 
tax when shopping. For example: if a goods price of $100 and the tax rate of 25%, the buyer need to pay 100 + 100 × 
25% = $125. 
In China, the consumption tax belongs to tax included in price, i.e. the price of goods includes the tax, the buyer 
need not to pay an additional tax. For example: if a goods price of $125 and the tax rate of 20%, the buyer just pay 
$125, and the seller need to deduct the tax of 125 × 20% = $25, i.e. 125 – 25 = $100 is the real price which is belong 
to the seller.  
From the above examples we found that both the price and the tax in two tax modes are the same: $100 and $25, 
the payments of the buyers are both $125, the difference is that the tax rates are different: one is 25% and another is 
20%. 
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8.4. Non-tariff measure policy 
China has implemented strict planning and “Special Retail Permit”   
management system on tobacco production and sales. And it’s even more 
restrictive on the foreign tobacco companies. After China joined WTO the 
planning and the special retail permit system still existed, however, foreign 
tobacco companies wouldn’t be locked out of the Chinese market by 
administrative means and the quotas. According to the principles of “Market 
Opening” and “National Treatment”, foreign tobacco companies may obtain the 
special retail permit and compete fairly with the Chinese tobacco enterprises. 
8.5. Export tax rebate policy 
After accession to the WTO, China’s many preferential policies to 
encourage exports were abolished. Export subsidies are no longer applicable. 
But the export tax rebate policy in accordance with international practice does 
not belong to the export subsidies. Therefore, the export tax rebate policy will 
serve as one of China’s major means of foreign trade support to encourage 
export. 
As the foreign trade dependence of the China’s tobacco industry has been 
always low, to improve the export tax rebate policy is particularly important. This 
means that, to raise tax refund rate for export, as far as possible to implement 
the principle of “refund the tax which be levied”, so that China’s tobacco 
products can with the zero tax rate enter the international market, expand 
exports and enhance the international competitiveness. 
 
  53
9. Suggestion 
China’s tobacco tax has made great contribution to Chinese financial 
revenue. Since 1994 the Chinese government has been constantly adjusting 
and improving the tobacco taxation system. However, as the tobacco markets 
at home and abroad have been continually developing and changing and the 
tobacco control has become a global trend, the Chinese government should act 
more positively to adjust and improve the China’s tobacco taxation system.  
9.1. Gradually phasing out the tobacco tax 
 In 2006, China eliminated all agricultural product taxes to relieve farmers’ 
financial burdens. But the tobacco leaf was excluded in the tax exemption. It 
was renamed as a tobacco leaf tax. The main reason for imposing the tobacco 
tax is that the tobacco leaf tax accounted for a much higher proportion of the 
local government tax revenue. The abolition of the tobacco leaf tax will have a 
huge impact on the local economy. But I think that the tobacco leaf tax should 
be eliminated: 
1. The continued tobacco leaf tax charge not only violates the justice principle 
of taxation, but also hindered the farmers’ incentive for planting. 
Tobacco growers are also farmers. They should have the right to enjoy the 
tax exemption policy as other farmers do. Although the tobacco leaf tax is not 
directly charged on the tobacco growers, but to the purchaser at the purchasing 
process, finally the tax burden is transferred to the tobacco growers (because 
the purchasing price includes the tax). 
2. High tobacco leaf tax revenues belong to the local governments. This led to 
their excessive administrative intervention in the tobacco leaf production. 
In order to levy more tobacco leaf tax, the local government emphasized 
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the quantity rather than the quality of the tobacco leaf. The blind development 
of the tobacco production is not conductive to the optimization of the production 
distribution on tobacco leaf. 
3. The high tobacco leaf tax reduced the competitiveness  
While the tobacco leaf tax is not levied in most other countries, China 
levies so high tobacco leaf tax that it must inevitably affect the export 
competitiveness of China’s tobacco leaf. Far beyond that, but comparison with 
the import tobacco leaves the Chinese tobacco leaf had lost its price advantage 
in the domestic market, as the tobacco leaf tariff reduced substantially after 
China’s accession to the WTO. 
Certainly, the Chinese government can gradually reduce the tobacco leaf 
tax until it’s totally eliminated if the abolition of the tobacco leaf tax could have 
immediately financial pressure on the local government.  
To compensate for the lack of the local revenue resulting from the 
reduction and elimination of the tobacco leaf tax, the central government could 
increase the cigarette excise tax and transfer parts of the additional cigarette 
tax revenue back to the local government. 
9.2. Adjusting the cigarette excise tax 
9.2.1. Raising the cigarette excise tax 
In recent years, due to the global booming tobacco control activities, a lot 
of countries raised the tobacco excise tax, so as to control and reduce smoking. 
Even many countries and international organizations asked for unifying the 
global tobacco tax standard and proposed to raise the tax rate to 70%. 
Following the WHO FCTC guidelines, China as the contracting party must 
continue to increase the tax and the price of tobacco. 
After the latest adjustment of the tobacco tax, China’s tobacco tax rose to 
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48.7%. In spite of that, it is much lower than the international median tax rate, 
which is around 65–70%. This leaves big room for China to raise the tax in the 
future. 
At present, China’s excise tax is dominated by ad valorem tax, that is, the 
tax of the high-price cigarette is higher, and the specific excise tax accounts for 
a very small proportion of the cigarette tax, less than 10%. To increase the 
specific excise tax is relatively more effective to achieve the effect of the 
tobacco control, i.e. taxation according to quantity. In this way, it cannot only 
increase the cigarette price as a whole, but also reduce the difference on the 
tax and the price among various class cigarettes and reduce the substitution of 
the low-price cigarette. 
Hu et al. (2008) proposed that the Chinese government should consider 
significantly increasing the cigarette-specific excise tax from RMB 0.06 per 
pack to RMB 1 per pack. The specific excise tax has a direct effect on 
consumers. Buyers of a pack of cigarettes must pay the tax of RMB 1. The 
cheaper is the cigarette, the higher is the tax; the more cigarettes the 
consumers buy, the more taxes they pay. This has great psychological impact 
on the consumers.  
Of course, some people worry that the increase of the tax on and the price 
of tobacco will lead to an increase of tobacco smuggling. But some international 
experience showed that the intensity of smuggling in a region is closely related 
to the law enforcement by the government. For example, in Northern Europe, 
the tobacco price is pretty high, but smuggling activity is low. In Italy, the 
tobacco price is relatively low, but smuggling is rampant. Thus, this does not 
mean that the price increase must lead to smuggling. If the government can 
adopt effective measures to crack down on the smuggling, this problem can be 
prevented. In fact, China’s tobacco monopoly system is very powerful in 
cracking down on the smuggling. 
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9.2.2. Changing the collection link of the cigarette excise tax 
The aim is that changing the collection link of the cigarette excise tax 
adjusts the taxation distribution, i.e. changing the collection on the production 
link to both the production and the wholesale links. The new tobacco tax policy 
added an ad valorem tax by 5% on the wholesale link for the first time. But the 
ad valorem tax of 5% is not enough to change the absolute dependence of the 
local government on the tobacco leaf tax and the production tax. Therefore, the 
Chinese government needs to further make the adjustment on the collection 
link of the tobacco tax. 
Later, with the improving of the tax collection and management and the 
enhancing of the tax consciousness, tax collection should gradually shift to the 
cigarette excise tax at the retail link, in accordance with international practice. 
This can reduce the dependence of the local financial revenue on the tobacco 
production. The tax revenue can be associated with the tobacco marketing. The 
local protectionism will be weakened and market blockades will be broken. A 
unified tobacco market will be established in China. 
9.3. Changing “tax included in price” to “tax excluded in 
price” on the cigarette excise tax 
The advantage of tax included in price is that since tax are included in the 
price and the price has been set, the state can regulate the economy by 
adjusting the proportion of the tax inside the price. But the disadvantage is that 
under the condition of freely pricing the price need to be flexible, however, from 
the perspective of the government the taxation should remain stable within a 
certain period of time, the relatively fixed tax included in the price would have 
the price and the tax restrain each other, hence would make it difficult for the 
two sides to react flexibly. 
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The advantages of tax excluded in price are that the price and the tax are 
separated and the transparency is high. This makes it easy for consumers to 
monitor the price and the tax, and also facilitates enterprises to determine the 
price based on the market conditions. 
The comparatively higher cigarette tax aims primarily at curbing 
consumption. The consumers themselves shall be responsible for the higher 
cost as smoking cigarette may cause harms to health and society. In some 
developed countries the consumers are clear of how much tax to pay when 
buying cigarettes as the tax excluded in price was used. On the contrary 
Chinese consumers are not as the tax included in price was applied, neither do 
they understand that this part of tax is collected by the state to curb their 
cigarette consumption. Thus, the collection of the cigarette excise tax has little 
effect on cigarette consumption in China. 
The main reason why the tax included in price applied in China is because 
the tobacco tax was charged during the production process. Therefore, only in 
pace with the adjustment on the tax charge process can the tobacco tax be 
reformed into tax excluded in price at unified rate by changing the tax charge 
terminal from production to retails and wholesales (see 9.2.2.). 
9.4. Establishing the “Linkage of Tax and Price” 
mechanism of the tobacco 
The prospects for successful tobacco control by raising price depend on 
various conditions. The first condition is that the increase of the tax should be 
reflected in the price. The Chinese latest tax increase was ineffective to the 
tobacco control. The basic reason is that the tax increase was not reflected in 
the cigarette price. The tax changed, but the price did not. Therefore, it is 
impossible to have an impact on the cigarette consumption. 
In China, it is difficult to establish a natural “linkage of tax and price” on 
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tobacco because of the tobacco monopoly system. Since the tobacco 
management system can not completely be changed, the government should 
take full advantage of its pricing power. Hu Angang in a proposal which he 
submitted to the Chinese State Council10 opines that, in the tobacco monopoly 
system, the government may directly raise the price of the tobacco product 
through various means. It is an advantage that other countries do not have. But 
the increase of the cigarette price should be tied to the increase of the cigarette 
tax. And after the increase of the price, the new increased profits should be 
turned over to the central finance, so as to support the tobacco control and 
other health service, etc. 
9.5. Reforming the distribution system of the tobacco tax 
China’s current tobacco tax distribution system made local government   
over dependent on the tobacco industry. In order to maintain the local fiscal 
revenue and to offer the local areas employ abilities, the government over 
protected and expanded the local tobacco industry (include the tobacco leaf 
production and the cigarette manufacturing). 
Instead of sharing the tobacco tax with the local government the Chinese 
central government should consider collecting and keeping the entire tobacco 
tax revenue and let the Ministry of Finance and other central government 
agencies address revenue allocation to local government (Hu et al 2008). This 
can prevent the local government for its own interests from developing the 
tobacco industry blindly. 
9.6. Setting up the earmarked tax 
An earmarked tax designates its revenue on specific government 
programs. The Chinese government has already implemented earmarked 
                                                        
10 http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2010-01-20/161419509150.shtml 
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taxes, including educational taxes, environmental protection taxes, and 
gasoline taxes (Hu et al 2008). 
The fund for China’s tobacco control was very poor and mainly sourced 
from abroad. Little can be gained from the government support. This is very 
abnormal. The Chinese government should consider using the increased part 
of the tobacco tax or the 1% of the tobacco tax revenue specially for the 
tobacco control, health promotion and service, environmental protection and so 
on. This will greatly put forward China’s tobacco control activities. 
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Appendix 1 
Abstract 
China’s tobacco industry is the main contributor of the state revenue. The 
huge amount of China’s tobacco tax revenue is inseparable from China’s 
tobacco taxation system and tobacco monopoly system. This thesis, in addition 
to the introduction of the establishment, the development and the reformations 
of these systems, analyzes the great impact of the tobacco taxation on the local 
government; the important role that the tobacco tax plays on the tobacco 
control as an economic means; the influence on the Chinese tobacco taxation 
with China’s joining the WTO. And meanwhile some suggestions are proposed 
on China’s tobacco taxation system. 
Keywords: Tobacco tax; Tobacco monopoly system; Tobacco control. 
Zusammenfassung 
Die chinesische Tabakindustrie ist der wichtigste Träger der staatlichen 
Einnahmen. Die riesigen Einnahmen der chinesischen Tabaksteuer sind 
untrennbar verbunden mit dem chinesischen Tabakbesteuerungssystem und 
dem System des Tabakmonopols. Neben der Einführung in die Entstehung, 
Entwicklung und Reformen dieser Systeme werden auch die große Auswirkung 
der Tabaksteuer auf die lokale Regierung sowie derer Einfluß als ein 
ökonomisches Mittel auf die Tabakkontrolle in der Arbeit analysiert. Darüber 
hinaus wird der Einfluß des Beitritts Chinas zur WTO auf die Tabakbesteuerung 
geschildert. Zum Schluß werden auch einige Vorschläge über das chinesische 
Tabakbesteuerungssystem gemacht. 
Schlagwöter: Tabaksteuer; System des Tabakmonopols, Tabakkontrolle. 
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Main activities and responsibilities Marketing Planning 
Name of employer Henan Province Electric Power Design Institute 
Type of business or sector Electricity 
  
Dates 03/2007 - 03/2008  
Occupation or position held Internship 
Main activities and responsibilities Insurance Broker 
Name of employer CHANG’AN INSURANCE BROKERS CO.,LTD 
Type of business or sector Insurance 
  
Education  
  
Dates 10/2009 - 10/2010 
Title of qualification awarded Master of Social and Economics 
Principal subjects  Financial Service, Controlling 
Name of organisation University of Vienna 
  
Dates 10/2004 - 07/2009  
Title of qualification awarded Bachelor of Social and Economics 
Principal subjects Financial Management 
Name of organisation University of Vienna 
  
  63
Dates 09/1998 - 06/2002  
Title of qualification awarded Bachelor of Management 
Principal subjects Marketing 
Name of organisation China University of Mining & Technology 
  
Languages  
  
Mother tongue Chinese 
Other languages German; English 
 
